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Human Uniqueness and Human 
Dignity: Persons in Nature and 
the Nature of Persons 
Holmes Rolston III 
  
         umanity itself is a dignity." Immanuel Kant sought a univer- 
       sal human dignity with his respect for persons.1 His high- 
principled claim continues, endorsed by the nations of the Earth, in 
the Preamble to the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: "[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity...of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in 
the world.2 
Such dignity is a core concept getting at what is distinctively hu-
man, commanding special moral attention. Our dignity figures in 
our personal identity, first at basic levels, where dignity is inalienable 
and common to us all, and further at developmental levels, where 
dignity can be achieved or lost, recognized or withheld. A person 
who has "lost his dignity" behaviorally is not thereby a person whom 
we can treat as without dignity in the native entitlement sense. A per-
son's dignity resides in his or her biologically and socially constructed 
psychosomatic self with an idiographic proper-named identity. 
At both levels, we should think of a gestalt, more than some quan- 
itative scalar quality. Dignity is an umbrella concept (something like 
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freedom, love, justice, integrity), which makes it at once inclusive 
and comprehensive, and yet raises issues of scope and precision.3 The 
plan here is to see whether we can make some progress toward rec-
ognizing distinctive human worth by articulating the ways in which 
humans differ from nonhuman animals. We will spiral around a con-
stellation of interrelated capacities, as often consulting what scientists 
are discovering as we are listening to the humanists. Awareness of the 
gulf separating humans from all other species can sensitize us to our 
potential for dignity. 
This could be important in an age when it is philosophically and 
scientifically fashionable to "naturalize" all phenomena, human be-
havior included. The skeptic will say that we here are resisting ac-
cepting human continuity with animal nature, exaggerating the di-
chotomy between humans and their nonhuman ancestors. Our reply 
is that just this human capacity to present arguments such as those 
we are here producing establishes this discontinuity and the dignity 
for which we are arguing. Paradoxically, the more we discover that we 
are products of an evolutionary process, descended from the apes, the 
more we find that the capacity we humans have to demonstrate this— 
requiring paleontology, genomics, cladistics, anthropology, cognitive 
science, neuroscience, philosophy, and ethics—distinguishes us from 
the rest and disrupts the continuity demonstrated. Our concern here 
is not primarily medical, but this search might highlight understand-
ing of what in humans we especially seek to protect, both in medi-
cine and elsewhere in human affairs. 
Nature and Culture 
Human dignity results from both (1) the nature of and in human 
nature and (2) the culture in which humans comprise their character. 
Humans live embodied lives. This embodiment, not itself undigni-
fied, is necessary but not sufficient. Our human biology opens up 
vast new possibility spaces in which our dignity can be (indeed must 
be) further nurtured in culture. In this respect, mixing our biological 
finitude with cultural refinements, we radically differ from animals. 
This search for such dignity, it now seems, is an all and only human 
assignment. 
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This search is anti-reductionist; we resist the claim that a human 
is "nothing but5' an animal. Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd find 
"that the existence of human culture is a deep evolutionary mystery 
on a par with the origins of life itself. ... Human societies are a spec-
tacular anomaly in the animal world."4 The human transition into 
culture is exponential, non-linear, reaching extraordinary epistemic 
powers. To borrow a term from the geologists, humans have crossed 
an unconformity. To borrow from classical philosophers, we are look-
ing for the unique differentia of our genus. 
Animals do not form cultures, at least not cumulative transmis-
sible cultures. Information in wild nature travels intergenerationally 
largely on genes; information in culture travels neurally as persons are 
educated into transmissible cultures. Animals inherit some skills by 
copying the behavior of others, but genetics remains the dominant 
mode of intergenerational information transfer. The determinants of 
animal and plant behavior are never anthropological, political, eco-
nomic, technological, scientific, philosophical, ethical, or religious. 
The intellectual and social heritage of past generations, lived out in 
the present, re-formed and transmitted to the next generation, is reg-
ularly decisive in culture. 
The term "culture" is now commonly used of some animals, 
which is done partly by discovering behavior of which we were previ-
ously unaware, but also by revising the scope of the term "culture" 
to include behavior transmitted by imitation. In this sense culture is 
present not only among primates, but among birds, when they learn 
songs or migration routes from conspecifics. If so, we need another 
term, super-culture, for the human cultural capacities, or at least 
more precision in distinguishing kinds of culture. 
Opening an anthology on Chimpanzee Culture, the authors 
doubt, interestingly, whether there is much of such a thing: "Cultural 
transmission among chimpanzees is, at best, inefficient, and possibly 
absent." There is scant and in some cases negative evidence for active 
teaching of the likeliest features to be transmitted, such as tool-using 
techniques. Chimpanzees clearly influence each others behavior, and 
seem to intend to do that; they copy the behavior of others. But 
there is no clear evidence that they attribute mental states to others. 
They seem, conclude these authors, "restricted to private conceptual 
worlds."5 
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One way to gauge this is to inquire about intentional teaching, 
which involves the effort to transfer ideas from mind to mind. There 
is little critical evidence for such teaching in nonhuman animals; the 
best such evidence is still equivocal. One can trim down the mean-
ing of "teaching," somewhat similarly to reducing the definition of 
"culture," and find noncognitive accounts of teaching. Interestingly, 
a recent study suggests a form of teaching not in the primates, where 
it is usually looked for, but in wild meerkats. Adults differentially 
cripple prey for their young to hunt, depending on how naive the 
juvenile hunter is.6 Many predators release crippled prey before their 
young, encouraging their developing hunting skills.7 
But if teaching is found wherever individuals have learned to 
modify their behavior so that the naive learn more quickly, then 
teaching is found in chickens in the barnyard, when the mother hen 
scratches and clucks to call her chicks to newfound food, with the 
chicks soon imitating her. The meerkat researchers conclude that they 
exhibit only simple differential behavior, responding to the handling 
skills of the pups, without the presence of ideas passing from mind 
to mind. There need not even be recognition (cognition) of pupil's 
ignorance; there is only modulated behavior in response to the suc-
cess or lack thereof of the naive, with the result that the naive learn 
more efficiently than otherwise. There is no intention to bring about 
learning, and such behavior falls far short of customary concepts of 
teaching, undoubtedly present in ourselves. 
Indeed, teaching in this differential behavior sense is found even 
in ants, when leaders lead followers to food.8 If we are going to inter-
pret such animal activities as (behavioral) teaching, then we need a 
modified account of (ideational) teaching, where teacher deliberately 
instructs disciple. In this sense of teaching, Bennett G. Galef con-
cludes, "As far as is known, no nonhuman animal teaches."9 Richard 
Byrne finds that chimpanzees may have glimmerings of other minds, 
but he sees little evidence of intentional teaching.10 
Although chimpanzees collaborate to hunt or get food, Michael 
Tomasello and his colleagues conclude "with confidence" that "chim-
panzees do not engage in collaborative learning. ... They do not con-
ceive of others as reflective agents—they do not mentally simulate the 
perspective of another person or chimpanzee simulating their per-
spective. ... There is no known evidence that chimpanzees, whatever 
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their background and training, are capable of thinking of other in- 
teractants reflectively."11 "Nonhuman primates in their natural habi-
tats ... do not intentionally teach other individuals new behaviors."12 
Daniel Povinelli and his colleagues conclude of chimps: "There is 
considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representa-
tions of mental states in general. ... Although humans, chimpanzees, 
and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans 
alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about 
such states."13 Without some concept of interactive teaching, of ideas 
moving from mind to mind, from parent to child, from teacher to 
pupil, a cumulative transmissible culture is impossible. 
Humans, then, can participate intensively in the knowledge and 
skills that each other has acquired. Such capacity to encounter ideas 
in others who serve as role models gives rise to estimates of the worth 
of these others and, reciprocally, of their estimate of one's own worth. 
This will at first include estimates by the disciple of how expert is the 
teacher, and by the teacher of how well the disciple is doing. These are 
already value judgments; they will begin simply but, once launched, 
will grow more complex, involving deeper senses of achievement and 
worth among the interactants. For example, we are here engaged in 
such "collaborative learning" about human dignity, in conversation 
with both scientists and humanists. But this involves respect for the 
wisdom and perspective of others, and efforts both to recognize and 
to improve upon them, and that brings us to the threshold of human 
dignity. 
This collaborative learning is what has produced human cultures. 
Human dignity includes the capacity for growing into and assimilat-
ing a cumulative transmissible culture. So part of one person's dignity 
may be that he is Scots, raised not only on that landscape but into 
that culture. She is a southern lady, declining now in her latter years, 
and altered in her original views on racial segregation (the result of 
collaborative learning), but still firm in her classic embodiment of 
the culture of the Old South and what it meant to be a woman of 
dignity. Animals, failing such cultural heritages, fail in such possibili-
ties of dignity. 
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Human Dignity and Animal Integrity 
This "separatist" approach we are using here, distinguishing humans 
from animals, could have undesirable results if it led us to devalue 
(nonhuman) animal life. Research over recent decades has increas-
ingly shown sophistication in animal minds.14 One ought to respect 
life, both animal and human. Nevertheless, human life carries a 
dignity that merits an especially high level of respect. Recognition 
of the intrinsic values in nature needs careful analysis, ongoing in 
environmental ethics. This will include a welcome appreciation of 
animal integrity. But we should also be discriminating about human 
uniqueness, and that obligation is encapsulated in the idea of "hu-
man dignity" 
We would not, for instance, attribute "dignity" to rocks or trees, 
nor even to the Grand Canyon or a giant sequoia, though we might 
find them majestic or sublime.* 
We would puzzle over whether a bear or an eagle has "dignity" 
while never denying their charismatic excellence. We say that the 
Thomson's gazelles run with grace, without thinking that their flight 
from the approaching cheetah is dignified. There are parallel prob-
lems with "virtue," going back to the Greek areté. "Virtue" has the 
root idea of some effective "strength"; areté was at times applied to 
"excellence" in animals, found in diverse forms in diverse kinds. Nev-
ertheless, "virtue" and areté, like "dignity," have come principally to 
refer to the highest human potentials and achievements. Can we be 
discriminating about our human dignity without losing discernment 
of the worth of animal excellences? 
Critics will ask whether it might be a mistake to look to other be-
ings less complex than we are to understand what we are (the genetic 
* Etymology is not much help here. The Latin dignitas refers to worth, merit, 
desert, and honor, but also to rankings of all kinds. In Middle English, the modern 
uses are present, such as worth, honor, nobleness, as well as rankings applied to 
nonhurnans. The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) cites from 1594: "Stones, though in dignitie of nature inferior to 
plants"; and from 1657: "the dignity and value of Fruit-trees." Even planets have 
more dignity in some positions of the Zodiac than others. From 1751: "There is 
no kind of subject, having its foundation in nature, that is below the dignity of a 
philosophical inquiry." The word "human" is derived from humus, Latin for "earth" 
or "soil," but that is of little help in understanding its present meaning. 
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fallacy). If there has been any evolutionary emergence in humans, 
the whole idea of an emergent quality is that it cannot be predicted 
or understood by looking at (or reducing things to) the simpler 
precedents. True, we do not learn what it means to be human by 
studying chimpanzees. Nevertheless, with animals as a foil, if we can 
gain some account of the thresholds we have crossed, we might get a 
more focused picture of the human uniqueness and of our resulting 
dignity. 
Terrence W. Deacon puts this pointedly: "Hundreds of millions 
of years of evolution have produced hundreds of thousands of species 
with brains, and tens of thousands with complex behavioral, per-
ceptual, and learning abilities. Only one of these has ever wondered 
about its place in the world, because only one evolved the ability 
to do so."15 Oriented by such a worldview, a person can choose his 
or her goals, thoughts, and career in ways that animals cannot; this 
capacity to give self-direction to one s own life, with whatever realiza-
tion of it has been accomplished, is worthy of intrinsic respect. These 
traits are both threshold and aristocratic. 
Biologically, there is a distinctiveness to being human not found 
in other animals. This dignity is ipso facto democratically present in 
human beings, a legacy of our phylogeny, unfolding and actualized in 
the ontology of each person. Simultaneously, this suite of traits opens 
up the space of possibilities such that, psychologically, there can be 
comparative success and failure in this actualization. One can more 
or less realize these ideational, idiographic, existential, and ethical 
opportunities common in basic senses to us all, but in which some 
are more and less gifted, fortunate, encouraged, resolute, and success-
ful than others. Dignity matures with the continued perseverance of 
a meaningful life project. 
A chimp cannot ask, with Socrates, whether the unexamined life 
is worth living, much less be shamed for not having done so, or trou-
bled by failure to live up to its goals. "Man is the only animal that 
blushes. Or needs to." Mark Twain takes from Pudd'nhead Wilson's 
New Calendar this folk wisdom about embarrassed dignity, impos-
sible for animals.16 "They knew that they were naked" (Genesis 3:7). 
If, in the course of medical treatment, one covers up the patients na-
kedness, there is decency, dignity. With animals, there is nothing to 
cover. If we should discover that animals can blush or know that they 
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are naked, we might have to revise our beliefs about their dignity. 
Until then, let this separate human dignity from animal integrity. 
Ideational Uniqueness 
But, if a universe were to crush him, man would still be more 
noble than that which killed him, because he knows that 
he dies and the advantage which the universe has over him; 
the universe knows nothing of this. All our dignity consists, 
then, in thought.17 
Pascal's insights have been reinforced in contemporary biology 
and animal behavior studies. As philosophers from ancient Greece 
onward have claimed, humans are "the rational animals." Scientific 
research continues to confirm this ideational uniqueness. Humans 
are remarkable among all other species in their capacities to process 
thoughts, ideas, symbolic abstractions figured into interpretive ge- 
stalts with which the world is understood and life is oriented. Evi-
dence of that comes from studies in the nature of language and in 
neuroscience. This is a constitutive dimension of our worth, our 
dignity. 
Stephen R. Anderson, a linguist, concludes: 
When examined scientifically, human language is quite dif-
ferent in fundamental ways from the communication systems 
of other animals. ... Using our native language, we can pro-
duce and understand sentences we have never encountered 
before, in ways that are appropriate to entirely novel circum-
stances. ... Human languages have the property of including 
such a discrete infinity of distinct sentences because they are 
hierarchical and recursive. That is, the words of a sentence are 
not just strung out one after another, but are organized into 
phrases, which themselves can be constituents of larger phras-
es of the same type, and so on without any boundary.18 
The result is "massive differences in expressive capacities between hu-
man language and the communicative systems of other animals":19 
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No other primate functions communicatively in nature even 
at the level of protolanguage, and the vast gulf of discrete, re-
cursive combinability must still be crossed to get from there 
to the language capacity inherent in every normal human. 
We seem to be alone on our side of that gulf, whatever the 
evolutionary path we may have taken to get there.20 
This ideational uniqueness involves complex use of symbols. Ian 
Tattersall concludes: 
We human beings are indeed mysterious animals. We are 
linked to the living world, but we are sharply distinguished 
by our cognitive powers, and much of our behavior is condi-
tioned by abstract and symbolic concerns.21 
Similarly, Richard Potts concludes: 
In discussing the evolution of human critical capacities, the 
overarching influence of symbolic activity (the means by 
which humans create meaning) is inescapable. Human cul-
tural behavior involves not only the transmission of non- 
genetic information but also the coding of thoughts, sensa-
tions, and things, times, and places that are not visible. All 
the odd elaborations of human life, socially and individually, 
including the heights of imagination, the depths of deprav-
ity, moral abstraction, and a sense of God, depend on this 
symbolic coding of the nonvisible.22 
This means of course that humans can form a symbolic sense of self, 
with its dignity. 
The nature and origins of language is proving, according to some 
experts in the field, to be "the hardest problem in science."23  Kuni- 
yoshi L. Sakai finds: "The human left-frontal cortex is thus uniquely 
specialized in the syntactic processes of sentence comprehension, 
without any counterparts in other animals."24 The result is our men-
tal incandescence. 
We now neuroimage blood brain flow to find that such thoughts 
can reshape the brains in which they arise. Genes make the kind of 
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human brains possible that facilitate an open mind. But when that 
happens, these processes can also work the other way around. Minds 
employ and reshape their brains to facilitate their chosen ideologies 
and lifestyles. Our ideas and our deliberated practices configure and 
reconfigure our own sponsoring brain structures. 
Joaquin M. Fuster, a neuroscientist, finds that in human brains 
there is an "emergent property" that is "most difficult to define": 
As networks fan outward and upward in associative neocor- 
tex, they become capable of generating novel representations 
that are not reducible to their inputs or to their individual 
neuronal components. Those representations are the product 
of complex, nonlinear, and near-chaotic interactions between 
innumerable elements of high-level networks far removed 
from sensory receptors or motor effectors. Then, top-down 
network building predominates. Imagination, creativity, and 
intuition are some of the cognitive attributes of those emer-
gent high-level representations.25 
This is what philosophers call "top down" causation (an emergent 
phenomenon reshaping and controlling its precedents), as contrasted 
with "bottom up" causation (simpler precedent causes fully determi-
native of more complex outcomes). Quantitative genetic differences 
add up to qualitative differences in capacity, an emerging cognitive 
possibility and practical performance that exceeds anything known 
in previous evolutionary achievements. This native endowment and 
potential, more and less actualized across a person's career, comes to 
constitute his or her dignity. Some trans-genetic threshold seems to 
have been crossed. 
Geneticists decoded the human genome, confirming how little 
humans differ in their protein molecules from chimpanzees,* only to 
* Humans may differ in protein molecules from chimpanzees by only some 3 
percent. But they do have nearly 400 percent more cerebral cortex. Also, the mi-
croscopic fine structures of synaptic connections are much more open and com-
plex; see Michael Baiter, "Brain Evolution Studies Go Micro," Science 315(2007): 
1208-1211. The human postsynaptic membrane contains over a thousand dif-
ferent proteins in the signal-receiving surface. "The most molecularly complex 
structure known [in the human body] is the postsynaptic side of the synapse," 
according to Seth Grant, a neuroscientist (quoted in Elizabeth Pennisi, "Brain 
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realize that the startling successes of humans doing just this sequencing of 
their own genome as readily proves human distinctiveness. Humans have 
made an exodus from determination by genetics and natural selection and 
passed into a mental and social realm with new freedoms, 
J. Craig Venter and over 200 geneticist co-authors, completing the 
Celera Genomics sequencing of the human genome, caution: 
In organisms with complex nervous systems, neither gene 
number, neuron number, nor number of cell types correlates in 
any meaningful manner with even simplistic measures of 
structural or behavioral complexity. ... Between humans and 
chimpanzees,  the gene number,  gene structures and func- 
tions, chromosomal and genomic organizations, and cell 
types and neuroanatomies are almost indistinguishable, yet 
the developmental modifications that predisposed human 
lineages to cortical expansion and development of the larynx, 
giving rise to language, culminated in a massive singularity 
that by even the simplest of criteria made humans more com- 
plex in a behavioral sense. ... The real challenge of human 
biology, beyond the task of finding out how genes orchestrate 
the construction and maintenance of the miraculous mecha- 
nism of our bodies, will lie ahead as we seek to explain how 
our minds have come to organize thoughts sufficiently well 
to investigate our own existence.26 
This ''massive singularity" of our ideational uniqueness introduces 
massive dignity. 
Idiographic Uniqueness 
"Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is ... history."   José Ortega y 
Gasset pinpoints, with emphasis, the human idiographic uniqueness. 
He continues: "Expressed differently: what nature is to things, his- 
tory, res gestae, is to man."27 More carefully put, nature too has a 
Evolution on the Far Side," Science 314 (2006): 244-245. 
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history—natural history, but humans superimpose on their nature a 
remarkable capacity to experience and to individuate their narrative 
careers. Humans have a capacity for enacted individuality that is not 
otherwise known in the animal world. This makes possible biogra-
phy, transcending the biology on which it is superimposed. 
Again, we must use some care. All nature is natural history, gen-
erating distinct individuals as well as historical times and geographi-
cal places, and one sometimes needs to make that point. Each bat is 
particular. A mother bat, who has been out all night catching insects, 
can return to Bracken Cave in Texas and find and feed her own pup 
in total darkness, among millions of other bat pups. Such animal 
skills result from the biological requirement that mothers and their 
young recognize each other, if the best-adapted are to survive. Hu-
mans and many animals have immunologically unique bodies. Such 
particularity is welcome in the natural world. 
Meanwhile, humans remain unique in their escalated degrees of 
freedom, their voluntary intentional actions, guided by these new 
powers of cognitive and symbolic thought, analytic reason, and con-
scious aspiration. While most creatures respond to somatic biological 
and ecological circumstances, humans are drawn into a future by 
constructed visions of their fullest flourishing, by their ideologies. We 
enact ourselves as interpreted story; each person enjoys constructing 
his or her idiographic storied residence on Earth. 
In the vocabulary of neuroscience, we map brains to discover 
that we have "mutable maps." Michael Merzenich, a neuroscientist, 
reports his increasing appreciation of "what is the most remarkable 
property of our brain: its capacity to develop and to specialize its 
own processing machinery, to shape its own abilities, and to enable, 
through hard brainwork, its own achievements."28 For example, with 
the decision to play a violin well, and with resolute practice, string 
musicians alter the structural configuration of their brains, to facili-
tate the differential use of left and right arms, fingering the strings 
with one and drawing the bow with the other.29 Likewise, musicians 
enhance their hearing sensitivity to tones, enlarging the relevant au-
ditory cortex by 25% compared with non-musicians.30 
With the decision to become a taxi driver in London, and with 
long experience driving about the city, drivers likewise alter their 
brain structures, devoting more space to navigation-related skills 
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than do non-taxi drivers. "There is a capacity for local plastic change 
in the structure of the healthy adult human brain in response to en-
vironmental demands."31 Similarly, researchers have found that "the 
structure of the human brain is altered by the experience of acquiring 
a second language."32 Or by learning to juggle.33 
So our minds shape our brains. The authors of a leading neuro- 
science text use the violin players as an icon for us all and conclude: 
"It is likely that this is an exaggerated version of a continuous map-
ping process that goes on in everyone's brain as their life experiences 
vary."34 This brain is as open as it is wired up; the self we become is 
registered by its synaptic configurations, which is to say that the in-
formation from personal experience, both explicit and implicit, goes 
to pattern the brain. The informing of the mind, our psychological 
experiences reconfigure brain process, and there are no known limits 
to this global flexibility and interactivity. "Plasticity is an intrinsic 
property of the human brain."35 
Nature endows human persons with the capacity for distinctively 
particular, self-reflective biographies. Embodied we humans are, and 
limited by flesh and blood, but there are no such limits to what hu-
mans can think or to the imagination of our minds. The possibility 
space is endlessly open. In a study of infinity, John D, Barrow consid-
ers what is in effect a mental infinity (though technically a massively 
large number): 
By counting the number of neural configurations that the 
human brain can accommodate, it has been estimated that it 
can represent about  107000,000,000,000  possible "thoughts*— 
for comparison there are only about 1080 atoms in the entire 
visible Universe. The brain is rather small, it contains only 
about 1027 atoms, but the feeling of limitless thinking that 
we possess derives not from this number alone but from the 
vastness of the number of possible connections that can exist 
between groups of atoms. This is what we mean by complex-
ity, and it is the complexity of our minds that gives rise to 
that feeling that we are at the centre of unbounded immensi-
ties. We should not be surprised. Were our mind significantly 
simpler, then we would be too simple to know it.36 
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Animal minds are too simple to know such things. That we humans 
have such potential to forge endless thoughts and imaginations, and 
to incorporate these into our unique biographies, is evidence of our 
dignity. 
Despite the contributions of science in confirming such unique-
ness, this search for the dignity latent in idiographic uniqueness will 
not be straightforward science. Science has little interest in particu-
lars for their particularity after they have been included as instances 
of a universal type. It has little interest, for instance, in proper names 
as essential to its content. An ethical account, however, will retain an 
interest in particulars both for their constitutive power in enriching 
the universal model and as loci of value. It admires proper names no 
less than theoretical models. 
The human mind creates for itself a unique person, a human 
being placed in a community of other humans, with its own em-
bodied self-consciousness in the midst of others equally idiographic. 
Humans are reared over decades in families, from which they ac-
quire their identities, characters, habits, neighborhoods, networks of 
support, commitments, worldviews. Animals too can be social, but 
an animal's surroundings do not constitute for it this self-reflective 
ideational, narrative, biographical identity. The person can follow a 
biography, cradle to grave, as no animal can. 
The person knows the name of his or her father, mother, sisters, 
brothers, hometown, the favored or disliked math teacher, the day of 
his or her marriage, a career (or hopes thereof). With chimpanzees, 
if a brother departs and disperses to another troop for a year and 
then returns, brother does not remember and recognize (re-cognize) 
brother. Chimps take their family and troop cues from whoever is 
nearby and do not have the concept of "brother." But humans cog-
nize such family relationships; this family identity enters into their 
personal identity—a narrated story line. A human life makes sense 
from a distinctly individual point of view, in ways that differ from 
animal life. 
Michael Tomasello continues: 
Any serious inquiry into human cognition, therefore, must 
include some account of these historical and ontogenetic 
processes, which are enabled but not in any way determined 
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by human beings' biological adaptation for a special form of 
cognition.... My central argument...is that it is these pro-
cesses, not any specialized biological adaptations directly, 
that have done the actual work in creating many, if not all, of 
the most distinctive and cognitive products and processes of 
the species Homo sapiens.37 
Other mammals are also constituted by their relationships, but they 
do not display these kinds of self-reflective cognitive understandings. 
We can form ideas of other minds, and of our own mind in encoun-
ter with other minds, and this, already by virtue of that capacity 
alone, accentuates human talents. But in the exercise of this skill, 
we form estimates of the embodied mental states in ourselves and in 
others whom we encounter. In such activity the possibility of dignity 
gained or lost arises. 
Such powers and performance will variously be limited by disease, 
juvenile condition or aging, economic and cultural circumstances, 
failure of will, past successes and defeats, sometimes by coercion from 
others, but dignity can remain in the potential for development, for 
regeneration, or in the courage and resolution with which one faces 
such threats, struggling to retain a dignified quality of life. 
Existential Uniqueness 
Only humans are "persons," enjoying "existential uniqueness." "Hu-
man being" is perhaps a biological term, but "person" refers to the 
further existential dignity associated with an experiencing subjectiv-
ity with personal identity, a phenomenological "I" conserved with 
ongoing agency and responsibility. We can wonder whether neuro- 
science has (or ever will have) access to how the multiple streams of 
perception, images, and ideas are melded into such an experienc-
ing "I." Mark F. Bear and his colleagues, somewhat revealingly, call 
this problem "the Holy Grail of neuroscience."38 The difficulty is in 
understanding how thoughts in the conscious mind form, re-form, 
or, more accurately, in-form events in this brain space to construct an 
inhabited first-person with direct self-awareness. 
The term "personality" is sometimes used of animals, usually to 
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mark individual variations of temperament, arousal, sociability, curi-
osity, and similar traits. Jennifer A. Mather and Roland C Anderson 
give an account of the "personalities of octopuses."39 They hardly in-
tend that these are persons; rather they borrow that term to describe 
their differentiated individuality. This is more accentuated in higher 
animals. But such "personality" is a behavioral, not an existential 
claim, more metaphorical than literal. 
With humans we need, somewhat provocatively, the term "spirit" 
to get past the consciousness that is present in animals and capture 
this self-reflective inwardness. We need what the Germans call Geist 
or what existentialist philosophers call Existenz. Each person has a 
lone ecstasy, an ek-stasis, a "standing out," an existence, where the I 
is differentiated from the not-I. Only in humans is there such genius 
(recalling the Latin connotations). 
Animals do not feel ashamed or proud; they do not have angst. 
They do not get excited about a job well done, pass the buck for fail-
ures, have identity crises, or deceive themselves to avoid self-censure. 
They do not resolve to dissent before an immoral social practice and 
pay the price of civil disobedience in the hope of reforming their so-
ciety. They do not say grace at meals. They do not act in love, faith, or 
freedom, nor are they driven by guilt or to seek forgiveness. They do 
not make confessions of faith. They do not conclude that the world 
is absurd and go into depression. They do not get lost on a "darkling 
plain" (Matthew Arnold, Dover Beach). They do not worry about 
whether they have souls, or whether these will survive their death. 
They do not reach poignant moments of truth. 
Animal particularities are mute; humans can articulate their in-
dividual biographies. A persons narrated story line—with a norma-
tive fiction setting a gap between the real and the ideal, and intro- 
spectively orienting the real—produces a persona, a lived presence to 
which each self has privileged access. There is an immediately given 
self, always in encounter with opportunity and threat. We experi-
ence romance and tragedy. This idiographic inwardness becomes a 
proper-named Presence, an "I," an ego. Such an "I" confronts others 
as "Thou."40  This is the elation of auto/bio/graphy, not yet intellec- 
tual in the child, often not in the adult, but always existential and 
impulsive from our psychic depths. 
Neuroscience has imaged much of the brain, only to realize that 
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it was imaging brains or, more accurately blood flow in brains, and 
not thoughts articulated in the minds of persons. There has been 
little or no success in correlating the flow of mental representations 
(as when the story unfolds in a novel) with the details of neural archi-
tecture, even though one can map some of the synaptic connections 
and reconnections. What will neuroscientists think when, imaging 
their own thinking brains, they ask one another how it is that one 
species has gained the capacity to do this, discuss the significance of 
such neuroscience, and watch the brain images of their discussion? 
Neuroscientists too are existential selves, historical persons with ca-
reers, each a subjective "I" in the midst of "Thous," even when they 
make "it-objects" of their brains. 
The capacity for one person to take the mind of another, mind- 
reading as it were, produces in humans their capacity to be insulted 
and belittled, or to be respected and treated with dignity. Not only 
can we learn from others, but we can learn what they think of us— 
not just how they treat us (animals can learn that), but their point 
of view toward us. 1 can take up the ideational perspective of others, 
but that means I can infer their ideational perspective toward me. 
Relationships become interpersonal. 
Such a "person" can suffer affliction by verbal insult (including 
omissions), of which animals are incapable, although animals can 
be ostracized. A human being can self-reflect about his or her status 
and encountered behavior in the view of others. "I am being treated 
poorly here, perhaps because I am poor."  "I wonder if I should com-
plain, or just be glad to get minimal emergency room service." "I was 
wrong about that woman being a nurse; she's a doctor. The nurses 
are more respectful than are the doctors. They treat me like a real 
person." Animals have no such capacities. 
Bertrand Russell analyzes how, with language, humans can expe-
rience themselves biographically and present that biographical self to 
others. Animals can do neither. "A dog cannot relate his autobiog-
raphy; however eloquently he may bark, he cannot tell you that his 
parents were honest though poor."41 But a person can tell you that; 
indeed, for many persons, the fact that they and their parents have 
been honest, though poor, is the linchpin of their dignity. 
With humans, the medical therapist is likely to work with a pa-
tient's face, hands, genitalia with more awareness of personhood, 
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as would not be the case for a veterinarian with animals—think of 
hands versus paws, for instance. The human face has evolved progres-
sively refined features of self-expression, with more than thirty finely 
tuned muscles of facial expression and vocal control. This facilitates 
the subtle communication of moods, desires, intentions, personality, 
character. Animals too pick up subtle behavioral cues, as when they 
play, or when they recognize that a predator is hungry. But humans 
take a slur of profanity as an affront to their dignity—unless the re-
mark is said with a sly smile, which can turn it into a compliment. 
Within minutes of birth infants turn their heads and eyes to-
ward faces, and within days they discriminate between the face of the 
mother and that of a stranger. Humans have a spectacular capacity 
to recognize faces; a person can distinguish his wife or his brother 
from any of the other six billion persons on Earth. Soon after birth, 
animals may imprint on parents; perhaps the human capacities arose 
from such animal precedents, initially selected for their survival val-
ue. Animals too notice eyes, and they react as if there is somebody 
there, even if they have no theory of mind. But such capacities for 
being present and for detecting presence in others—myself a person 
here, another person there—have in humans escalated into qualita-
tively different domains, 
Animals do not have a sense of mutual gaze in the sense of joint 
attention, of "looking with." "Nonhuman primates in their natural 
habitats...do not point or gesture to outside objects for others; do 
not hold objects up to show them to others; do not try to bring oth-
ers to locations so that they can observe things there; do not actively 
offer objects to other individuals by holding them out."42 They do 
not negotiate the presence of an existential self, interacting interper- 
sonally with other such agents, in the process of thinking about and 
pursuing goals in the world. Animals do see others in pursuit of the 
food, mates, or territories they wish to have; but they do not know 
that other minds are there, much less other spirits. This capacity for 
referencing others as distinct, intentional, existential selves like our-
selves gives rise to an enhanced sense of the worth of such fellow 
humans, parallel to our own worth. 
The principal focus of many discussions of human dignity is au-
tonomy. A violation of such autonomy shuts down this distinctively 
human openness for particular life-imagination, construction, and 
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responsibility. Violations of human dignity typically involve unjusti-
fied constraints on such chosen ideas, beliefs, attitudes, feelings. This 
may be by abuse, vilification, and ridicule, or by overlooking and 
neglect. Psychotropic drugs can be used to impose conformity and 
obedience. Medical treatment or hospital care can be insensitive to 
such freedom, so far as it remains in the patient. 
Dignity is a threshold concept, at first. All humans have it, and 
no animals—at least not with those characteristics analyzed here. But 
it is also a relative concept. Some behaviors are more dignified than 
others; some activities are beneath our dignity. Here the phenomeno- 
logical sense of self-identity enters, in the sense of a goal or norm to 
which we hold ourselves accountable. We find it difficult to say that 
some animal's behavior was undignified. But human beings, enacting 
their embodied lives, have the capacity to treat their own behavior, 
cognition, and careers as objects of contemplation for what they are 
in themselves; there is a dialectic of reflection and action. This makes 
possible "style" in presenting self to others, as when one makes an 
effort to dress, speak, and behave with dignity. 
Animals may fit into their social hierarchies; they can be keenly 
aware of their relations with conspecifics. They take up roles. Coyotes 
may have a hierarchy problem in the pack, but a coyote does not 
have an ego problem, wondering if its behavior is beneath its dignity, 
or if it has been treated without dignity by the alpha male. Humans 
evolved to have dignity when they evolved to be able to entertain the 
concept of dignity (and to acknowledge dignity by way of respect, 
recognition, courtesy), as chimpanzees cannot. 
Such self-presentation can become overstudied and artificial, so 
that dignity can collapse. We dislike those who project images. Dig-
nity operates often best at subliminal levels; but, on occasion, it can be 
brought to mind and refined. It is always near enough the surface to 
be readily affronted. Inherent dignity may be latent, an endowment; 
but expressed dignity always requires some considered self-control, 
an achievement. We are always keeping up a broken wholeness. Ani-
mals may exemplify the potential of their species with more or less 
success, but we do not know of any parallels of such considered and 
controlled dignity in animal behavior. 
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Ethical Uniqueness 
Ethics is distinctively a product of the human genius, a phenomenon 
of our social behavior. To be ethical is to reflect on considered 
principles of right and wrong and to act accordingly, in the face of 
temptation. This is a possibility in all and only human life, so that we 
expect and demand that persons behave morally and hold them re-
sponsible for doing so. This is true even when, alas, they are tragically 
diminished in capacity and we cannot presume to hold them to what 
they ought to have been, or perhaps once were, at least aspirationally. 
Such an emergence of ethics is as remarkable as any other event we 
know; in some form or other ethics is pervasively present in every 
human culture, whether honored in the observance or in the breach. 
This fact looms large in human dignity. 
In this, humans are unique; there is nowhere in animal behavior the 
capacity to be reflectively ethical. After a careful survey of behavior, 
Helmut Kummer concludes, "It seems at present that morality has no 
specific functional equivalents among our animal relatives."43 Peter 
Singer's Ethics has a section called "Common Themes in Primate 
Ethics," including a section on "Chimpanzee Justice," and he wants to 
"abandon the assumption that ethics is uniquely human."44 But many of 
the behaviors examined (helping behavior; dominance structures) are 
more pre-ethical than ethical; he has little or no sense of holding 
chimpanzees morally culpable or praiseworthy. 
Frans de Waal finds precursors of morality, but concludes: 
Even if animals other than ourselves act in ways tantamount to 
moral behavior, their behavior does not necessarily rest on 
deliberations of the kind we engage in. It is hard to believe 
that animals weigh their own interests against the rights of 
others, that they develop a vision of the greater good of so-
ciety, or that they feel lifelong guilt about something they 
should not have done. Members of some species may reach 
tacit consensus about what kind of behavior to tolerate or 
inhibit in their midst, but without language the principles 
behind such decisions cannot be conceptualized, let alone 
debated.45 
HUMAN UNIQUENESS AND HUMAN DIGNITY |    149 
As before with "culture" and with "teaching," finding "ethics'' in na-
ture is partly a matter of discovering previously unknown animal 
behavior, but mostly a matter of redefining and stretching what 
the word "ethics" means to cover behavioral adjustments in social 
groups. 
Christopher Boehm finds that in some primate groups not only 
is there dominance hierarchy, but there are controls to keep such 
hierarchy working because this produces arrangements that the pri-
mates can live with, improving their overall success. Chimpanzees 
fight with each other over food and mates; but fighting is unpleasant, 
so the chimps will allow the dominant to break up such fights. If, 
however, the dominant becomes overly aggressive, the chimps will 
gang up on the dominant, who can control one but not several ar-
rayed against him. The result is more "egalitarian behavior."46 Per-
haps such behaviors are the precursors out of which such maxims as 
"treat equals equally; treat unequals equitably" once emerged, but it 
must be equally clear that such chimps are orders of magnitude away 
from deliberate reflection on how to treat others fairly, respecting 
their rights, much less their dignity. 
After her years of experience with chimpanzees, and though she 
found among them pair bonding, grooming, and the pleasure of the 
company of others, Jane Goodall wrote: "I cannot conceive of chim-
panzees developing emotions, one for the other, comparable in any 
way to the tenderness, the protectiveness, tolerance, and spiritual 
exhilaration that are the hallmarks of human love in its truest and 
deepest sense. Chimpanzees usually show a lack of consideration for 
each others feelings which in some ways may represent the deepest 
part of the gulf between them and us."47 
Higher animals realize that the behavior of other animals can 
be altered, and they do what they can to shape such behavior. So 
relationships evolve that set behavioral patterns in animal societies— 
dominance hierarchies, for example, or ostracism from a pack or 
troop. But it is not within the animal capacity to become a reflective 
agent interacting with a society of similar reflective agents, knowing 
that other actors, like oneself, are (if normal) able to choose between 
options and bear responsibility for their behavior. Nor is there among 
nonhuman animals any cultural or ideological heritage to defend. 
Animals lack awareness that there are mental others whom one 
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might hold responsible. Or to whom one might be held responsible. 
This precludes any critical sense of justice, or in general of values that 
could and ought to be fairly shared because they are enjoyed by oth-
ers who, like oneself, are the existential subjects of their own lives. 
Even more, this lack precludes respecting the dignity of others as part 
of moral responsibility. Such consideration is not a possibility in their 
private worlds, nor is a morally binding social contract such as that 
in inter-human ethics. Yet all this, undeniably, has emerged within 
the human genius. 
Persons set up a reflective gap between the real and the ideal. The 
human must be moral, however brokenly the ideal mixes with the 
real, and in that consists the human dignity. So we find in persons 
an agent who must be oriented by a belief system, as animals are not, 
and that leaves us, in the end, with the question of how to autho-
rize such a belief system. Ethics is essential to the human genius; we 
cannot realize our dignity without it. To put this provocatively, not 
only are the animals pre-ethical, but even humans when operating 
as scientists are pre-ethical. For centuries we have been welcoming 
scientific insights into our apparent uniqueness, into how our hu-
man nature evolved out of animal nature. But in the end we find that 
science not only struggles to understand how amoral nature evolved 
the moral animal, but finds itself incompetent to analyze how even 
now Homo sapiens has duties, how to set up and resolve that reflective 
tension between real and ideal. 
Science and conscience have a complex, elusive relationship. 
Science needs conscience but cannot justify it. The is-ought divide 
continues, past, present, and future. Humans crossed it during their 
evolutionary history and now live in moral territory. That is dignity 
by heritage and endowment. But such endowment potential has to 
be made actual, generation after generation, in each new age, in each 
human life, lest we lose our dignity. After four hundred years of sci-
ence and enlightenment, the value questions in the 21st century re-
main as sharp and as painful as ever. Not the least of such questions is 
how to recognize and to respect human dignity. Much in our future 
depends on the answer. 
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